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Daniel B. de Castro Almeida and Frederico G. Jayme Jr.
S ince monetary stabilization in 1994, bank consolidation has been 
gathering pace in Brazil as part of a global concentration trend following 
bank deregulation processes. This article analyses the effect of bank 
concentration on lending in Brazil in the period 1995-2004, distinguishing 
two stages and estimating panel data for Brazil’s 27 federative units. The 
results support the hypothesis that the process of consolidation in the 
Brazilian banking sector has an adverse effect on lending, which mainly 
harms the less developed regions of the country.
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Since monetary stabilization, the Brazilian banking 
system has consolidated rapidly, as part of a global 
trend of concentration in the banking sector, mainly 
driven by greater deregulation. From the theoretical 
standpoint, there are two contradictory ways to explain 
this phenomenon. The fi rst argues that consolidation 
occurs because some institutions are more effi cient 
than others, which encourages mergers to obtain 
scale advantages. In this case, consolidation benefi ts 
consumers, since it is founded on greater institutional 
effi ciency. The other approach argues that bank mergers 
and acquisitions aim at obtaining greater market power, 
which is bad for consumers because they will have to 
pay more for banking services.
In the case of Brazil, the loss of infl ation-generated 
profi ts has encouraged consolidation of the sector. The 
process has also received offi cial support from the 
Government, through mechanisms such as the Incentive 
Programme for the Restructuring and Strengthening 
of the National Financial System (PROER), and the 
Programme of Incentives to Reduce the Presence 
of the State Public Sector in the Banking Activity 
(PROES), which aimed at making the banking system 
less vulnerable to shocks. Two types of concentration 
have been seen in Brazil since 1994: (i) a geographic 
concentration of bank branches; and (ii) a reduction 
in the number of banks as a result of merger and 
acquisition processes, compounded by liquidations and 
regional concentration.
This process has not gone unnoticed, not is it 
without major repercussions on the economy. Several 
international studies have sought to defi ne the relation 
that exists between fi nancial development and economic 
growth (Levine, 1997; Matos, 2002). Theoretical 
arguments have been put forward suggesting that 
f inancial system development has a positive and 
signifi cant effect on economic growth; and there is 
evidence that such development also boosts the growth 
rate of the Brazilian economy in particular (Matos, 
2002; Araújo and Dias, 2006).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of the 
bank concentration process on lending in Brazil. For that 
purpose, in addition to a statistical analysis of banking-
sector data and a review of articles published on this 
subject, panel data were estimated for the country’s 
27 federative units in the period 1995-2004, for the 
purpose of identifying the effects of the dynamic of 
bank concentration on lending at the regional level. The 
results support the hypothesis that bank concentration in 
Brazil between 1995 and 2004 had adverse consequences 
for credit: the absence of banks and branches, or a 
reduction in their number, has resulted in less lending. 
Lack of information makes it impossible to analyse this 
phenomenon for years later than 2004, in which lending 
in Brazil grew generally despite remaining well below 
the international average.
This article consists of five sections. Section 
II makes a brief review of theoretical studies of the 
relation between the fi nancial system and economic 
development; and it outlines the process of consolidation 
in the banking sector and highlights a number of key 
factors in lending decisions. Section III analyses the 
case of Brazil, identifi es the period of time in which 
the bank concentration process was most in evidence, 
along with the main characteristics of the process and 
its effects on lending. Section IV sets out the empirical 
results of the proposed model. Lastly, section V puts 
forward a number of conclusions.
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Financial development and its relationship with general 
economic development have long aroused the interest 
of a variety of authors.1 The question is whether 
economic development generates fi nancial development, 
or whether the causality runs in the opposite direction. 
There is no consensus on this topic, and there may even 
be dual causality. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that 
credit plays a crucial role in economic development.
Levine (1997) analyses the factors that promote 
the emergence and development of the fi nancial system, 
along with its effect on economic development. The 
author points out that transaction costs, including the 
cost of obtaining information, create the incentives 
needed for f inancial markets and institutions to 
emerge. Such institutions have the following key 
functions: (i) to facilitate transactions, providing 
risk protection and diversifi cation; (ii) to allocate 
resources; (iii) to supervise managers and exert 
corporate control; (iv) to mobilize saving; and (v) to 
facilitate trade in goods and services.
Through these functions and capacities, the 
fi nancial system alters the rate of saving and redirects 
it to a diverse range of capital assets, thereby promoting 
capital accumulation. To fulfi l such functions, banks 
have to make assets liquid and also provide information 
(Neuberger, 1997). This definition shows that the 
uncertainty associated with the capacity to convert assets 
into means of payment generates liquidity risk.2
Matos (2002) found evidence of a positive, causal 
and one-way relation in Brazil between f inancial 
development and economic growth. In another study, 
Araújo and Dias (2006) formed a model in which 
economic growth is a function of the capital stock and 
monetary variables such as bank reserves. Increases 
1 These include Levine (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997) 
and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996).
2 For Keynes (1992: pp.138), “Liquidity preference is a potentiality 
or functional tendency, which fi xes the quantity of money which the 
public will hold when the rate of interest is given.” Moreover, the 
necessary condition for liquidity preference to serve as a means 
of conserving wealth is uncertainty about the future interest rate. 
Accordingly, in periods of great uncertainty, the premium on relatively 
more liquid assets will rise in relation to less liquid ones. 
II
The banking system and lending: theory
and evidence for the case of Brazil
in the interest rate and infl ation tax have a negative 
but non-permanent effect on the rate of growth of 
GDP, while an increase in bank reserves permanently 
reduces the economy’s growth rate. In other words, 
the stock of bank reserves, calculated on the basis 
of regulation by the monetary authority and fi nancial 
agents’ expectations, has a permanent effect on the 
economy’s growth rate.
By generating a demand for deposits and choosing 
an appropriate combination of investments, banks offer 
savers a climate of security with respect to liquidity risks, 
while simultaneously facilitating long-term investments 
in more profi table projects. They also make a major 
contribution to the effective functioning of the economy. 
In contrast, the concentration process directly affects 
lending, particularly in the less developed regions. 
There are two explanations for this: (i) the structural 
hypotheses argues that mergers and acquisitions are 
motivated by the purchaser’s desire to gain market 
power and thus increase its profi t margins; and (ii) the 
effi ciency hypothesis suggests that, in a competitive 
environment, fi rms that manage to reduce their costs 
and increase their profi ts gain market share and thus 
increase their production scale; they therefore take 
over less effi cient fi rms, introduce better management 
practices and thus increase their own profi ts.
With regard to concentration, De Paula and 
Marques (2004) list the factors driving this process 
worldwide: (i) deregulation of f inancial services; 
(ii) greater openness of the banking sector to 
international competition; (iii) technological progress; 
and (iv) changes in business strategy. Banks pursue 
consolidation to obtain economies of scale and scope, 
increase their profi tability and extend their monopoly 
power. The objectives indicated in the two hypotheses 
are thus likely to be mixed.
In the debate over the degree of concentration of the 
banking system, the aim is to strike a balance between 
systemic stability and competitiveness. The greater the 
level of concentration, the larger banks will be and 
the more diversifi ed their activities; consequently, the 
banking system will be more stable and less fragile in 
the event of a crisis (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 
2006, p. 1584). Moreover, greater concentration can 
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increase the banks’ market power, thus boosting their 
profi ts. Lastly, with fewer banks it is easier to supervise 
the system. Greater market concentration facilitates 
the task of systemic supervision and inspection; and 
less competition, arising from concentration, would 
be expected to reduce the risk of bank failures and 
systemic fi nancial crises.
While the bank consolidation process affects 
lending, it is not the only factor. Banks manages their 
assets with a view to forming the best possible portfolio 
of securities within their expectations, both for the 
economy and in terms of returns on assets, seeking 
to balance liquidity and profi tability (De Paula and 
Alves Jr., 2003; Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan., 2004; 
Blum and Nakane, 2005). According to Keynes (1992), 
conventional behaviour plays an important role in the 
formation of expectations.
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Minsky (1986), 
the greater and more permanent is economic growth, 
the more fragile the fi nancial system will tend to be 
in times of crisis. Like any other economic agent, 
banks prefer liquidity, and this preference becomes 
accentuated when the future is more uncertain.3 Thus, 
when the economy is growing, expectations become 
increasingly positive and banks start to make more 
audacious loans, reducing their lending requirements 
and extending more risky credit.
Apart from the effects of economic circumstances 
on lending and the analysis banks make of their 
customers and projects, the effect of the credit 
regulatory framework should not be ignored, nor the 
capital requirements imposed on banks operating in 
the Brazilian market, as a result of the adoption of the 
Basel Agreement. 
In any event, the fact that credit has a positive 
effect on the economy is clear, and this makes it 
particularly important to analyse the consequences of 
bank concentration on lending. Banks in Brazil account 
for 96% of the fi nancial system, although the credit/ 
GDP ratio is lower than in other countries. The latter 
reveals the possibilities for credit growth in the country 
as a whole (IPEA, 2006). According to Meirelles (2006), 
the credit/GDP ratio in Brazil is roughly 30%, whereas 
in Chile it is 60% and in Germany it is above 100%.
III
Bank consolidation and concentration in Brazil
The bank consolidation process in Brazil, which 
gathered pace in the mid-1990s, began in 1988 when 
the National Monetary Council created the full-service 
bank (banco múltiplo) modality. In addition, following 
the stabilization process in 1994 and deregulation of the 
sector, the consolidation process was driven by additional 
bank concentration factors, such as the price stabilization 
process, the privatization program among State-owned 
banks and affi liation to the Basel Agreement.
Two simultaneous phenomena can be detected in 
the process of bank concentration in Brazil: geographic 
concentration of bank branches; and a large number of 
mergers, acquisitions and liquidations.
The fi rst of these phenomena is related to the 
guidelines issued by the monetary authorities, which 
have been amended in recent years, particularly in the 
early 1990s. In the early 1980s, the Central Bank of 
Brazil pursued a goal of extending bank services to 
all municipalities in the country, improving services 
in municipalities with less support, and adopting bank 
regionalization measures. When this policy was later 
abandoned, as banks had to cut costs following the 
disappearance of infl ation-generated profi ts, they began 
to redistribute their branches.4 
3 The concept of liquidity preference as a defence against uncertainty 
is theoretically different from the concept of information asymmetry 
proposed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
4 At the present time, to provide banking services in less developed 
regions, banks work through other institutions, such as lottery houses 
and post offi ces, as part of a process known as “bancarização”. 
Through Resolution 2707, the Central Bank of Brazil authorised 
full-service banks with a commercial portfolio, commercial banks and 
the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal) to hire fi rms 
as correspondents to supply the following services: reception and 
processing of applications to open demand, time and saving deposit 
accounts; reception and payments relating to demand, time and saving 
deposit accounts, together with investments in and withdrawals from 
investment funds; reception and payments arising from service 
agreements signed by the contracting party in accordance with current 
regulations; active or passive execution of payment orders on behalf 
of the contracting party; reception and processing of applications 
for loans and fi nancing; credit analysis and property registration; 
execution of security collection; other control services, including 
data processing and operations as agreed upon, together with other 
activities at the discretion of the Central Bank of Brazil.
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In addition, in the 1980s the banking system 
underwent two processes that significantly shaped 
its structure and fuelled the merger and acquisition 
phenomenon: the use of publicly-owned State banks 
to refi nance the debts owed by federative units; and 
the infl ationary process (Corrêa, 2006).
With regard to the inflationary process, the 
Real Plan cut off the main source of banking system 
profi tability at that time, namely a fl oating currency. 
Stabilization forced the banking system to rationalize 
its costs, close branches, lay off staff and invest more in 
automation (Corrêa, 2006; Vilhena and Sicsú, 2006). In 
addition to the loss of earnings from infl ation, publicly-
owned State banks were confronting management 
problems. These changes in the economic environment 
of the Brazilian banking sector, in conjunction with the 
consolidation process that was already underway across 
the world, gave rise to a far-reaching restructuring of 
the system. In the same period, Brazil signed the Basel 
Agreement, with a view to stengthening the soundness 
of the fi nancial sector; and it endeavoured to strengthen 
its banking sector against the risk of systemic crisis.
This restructuring was promoted by PROER and 
PROES,5 set up in 1995 and 1996, respectively, and 
the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC) (Corrêa, 2006). In 
addition, in 2001 the Federal Financial Institutions 
Strengthening Programme (PROEF) was created, under 
which the National Treasury took over part of the 
debts owed by the four banks controlled by the Federal 
Government: Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica 
Federal, Banco da Amazônia (BASA) and Banco do 
Nordeste (BNB). In addition, the Caixa, BASA and BNB 
each received an injection of funds.
In the early 1990s, of the 27 federative units, only 
the States of Tocantins and Mato Grosso do Sul had 
no State-owned commercial bank within their borders. 
It is easy to identify the effects of PROES and the 
privatization and liquidation processes. In 2002, only 
the States of São Paulo, Sergipe, Rio Grande do Sul 
and Espírito Santo still had a commercial bank under 
their control. In addition, the Federal Government 
had taken over the State banks of Ceará, Piauí and 
Santa Catarina with a view to privatization, which was 
actually accomplished in 2005 with the Ceará State 
bank (Freitas, 2005).
Apart from this, several State development banks 
ceased to exist; some of them were absorbed by 
other State banks before privatization, while others 
simply closed down or were turned into development 
agencies. Several States that did not have development 
banks created development agencies with the aim of 
alleviating the lending effects of the lack of publicly-
owned commercial banks, and the adoption of industrial 
and development policies in the region. Nonetheless, 
this paper only analyses lending by multipurpose banks 
with a commercial portfolio, commercial banks, and 
savings banks (caixas econômicas). This suggests that 
the activities of development banks and agencies should 
be analysed in the future.
It is important to note what happened with public 
banks in this restructuring process, after State-owned 
banks practically ceased to exist (see table 1). The 
reduction in the total number of banks was not linear 
and was much greater among public banks (about 56%) 
than among their private counterparts (almost 29%). In 
2004, the share of privately owned banks in the banking 
system was greater than in 1985, while the share of 
foreign private banks had risen by almost 20 percentage 
points. The same table shows that privatization is not 
the only cause of bank consolidation in Brazil. In 1995-
2004, the number of private banks dropped sharply, 
particularly in the fi rst part of the period. The process 
included acquisitions of major fi nancial institutions 
such as Banco Nacional, Banco Econômico and Banco 
Bamerindus, which helps to explain the concentration 
of assets in the second stage.
It is also interesting to note that the intensity of the 
process was much greater in the initial stage, especially 
in the case of publicly-owned banks. Later, although 
the number of banks continued to decline, the process 
was slower. Of the 18 public banks that disappeared in 
1995-2004, 13 of them ceased to exist before 1999 and 
fi ve afterwards. In other words, 72% of the reduction in 
the number of public banks during the period occurred 
in the fi rst stage. The pattern was similar among private 
banks, although on a smaller scale. An analysis of the 
subject of bank concentration shows that the larger-
sized banks hold a major share total banking sector 
assets (Central Bank of Brazil, 2006).
The largest banks have increased their share of the 
total assets of the banking system. In 1995-1999, only 
5 The main provisions of PROES were as follows: (i) 100% of 
resources needed to restore State banks to fi nancial health were made 
conditional on the privatisation of the institutions in question, or 
their transformation into development agencies, or else liquidation; 
(ii) federal assistance was limited to 50% of the resources needed if 
there was no transfer of shareholder control or transformation into 
development agencies (the other 50% would be the responsibility of 
State governments); (iii) the guarantees posted by the States, in the 
case of federal assistance, would need to be adequate in relation 
to the amount of loans; in the event of nonfulfi lment, the States 
authorised creditors to withdraw the amount corresponding to their 
deposit bank accounts (De Paula and Marques, 2004, p. 15).
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the 20 largest banks increased their total asset share; 
and in the following stage, the 20 largest increased 
their share every year except 2001. Among the fi ve 
and ten largest banks, the most signifi cant increase 
in their total asset share in only occurred after 2001, 
when the share of the fi ve largest banks was the lowest 
throughout the period analysed. 
When the number of banks was shrinking fastest, 
particularly in the case of publicly-owned banks, the 
largest institutions did not increase their share of total 
banking-sector assets. Nonetheless, in the second stage, 
which coincided with a recovery in the proportion of 
national private banks in the sector, and in which the 
decline in the number of banks faltered, the leading banks 
increased their share of total banking system assets.
It is thus possible to distinguish two stages in 
this process. In the fi rst (1995-1999), the number of 
banks operating in the system fell faster, particularly 
in the public sector. In the second stage (1999-2004), 
the number of banks continued to decline, but the 
largest players signifi cantly increased their share of 
total banking sector assets.
Bank concentration and the need to split the period 
of analysis into two stages are clearly shown by the 
concentration indices in the banking sector. Table 2 
shows the following indices: Herfi ndahl-Hirschman 
(HH), Hall-Tildeman (HT) and Theil enthropy index (T),6 
all three of which show increasing concentration over 
the period as a whole. In the fi rst stage, however, all 
three indices clearly show an increase in concentration; 
whereas in second stage the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman 
index and the Theil entropy index show fl uctuations, 
6 For the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman and Hall-Tideman indices, the value 
tends to 1 in the case of a monopolistic market structure. In the case 
of the Theil entropy index, a monopolistic structure is indicated by 
a value of zero, and the index is closer to 1 the more closely the 
structure approaches perfect competition. The Theil and Herfi ndahl-
Hirschman indices are the most widely used, since they take account 
of the relative size of each fi rm and can be standardised to facilitate 
conclusions. Nonetheless, it may be impossible to calculate those 
indices if the size of all enterprises in the sector is unknown, for 
which reason other partial indices are used such as the sector 
concentration ratio (Salazar and David, 2005).
TABLE 1
Brazil: number of banks, by type of ownership, at December each year
Banksª 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Public 32 32 27 22 19 17 15 15 15 14
 Private 210 198 190 182 175 175 167 152 150 150
   Nationalb 172 157 141 123 110 105 95 87 88 92
   Foreignc 38 41 49 59 65 70 72 65 62 58
Total 242 230 217 204 194 192 182 167 165 164
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Reports on the evolution of the national fi nancial system.
ª Includes full-service banks, commercial banks and savings banks (caixas econômicas).
b Includes national banks and national banks with foreign participation.
c Includes banks of mostly foreign ownership and branches of foreign banks.
TABLE 2
Brazil: trend in the concentration of bank assets (indices)a 
between December 1995 and June 2004
Indicesb 1995/12 1996/12 1997/12 1998/12 1999/12 2000/12 2001/12 2002/12 2003/12 2004/06
HH 0.0779 0.0789 0.0857 0.0965 0.0924 0.0893 0.0851 0.0906 0.0906 0.0836
HT  0.0408 0.0412 0.0511 0.0555 0.0566 0.0587 0.0585 0.0645 0.0631 0.0617
T  0.6908 0.6923 0.6708 0.6501 0.642 0.6555 0.6652 0.654 0.6734 0.6877
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Araújo, Neto and Salazar (2005).
a Refers to total assets.
b HH= Herfi ndahl-Hirschman index. HT = Hall-Tildeman index. T = Theil index
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but at the end of the period report a lower level of 
concentration than in 1999. The Hall-Tildeman index 
also displays fl uctuations, but in 2004 indicated higher 
concentration than in 1999.
It is worth considering whether bank concentration 
follows any regional pattern; and in fact the sector 
consolidation process seems to be very closely related 
to the Prebisch centre-periphery theory. A study by 
Alexandre, Tadeo Lima and Canuto (2005) concludes 
that the concentration of banking activity has become 
more intensifi ed in the city of São Paulo, and that 
this appears to be even greater when measured in 
terms of banking operations rather than the number of 
branches. A possible explanation for the high degree 
of bank concentration in São Paulo is local GDP. 
Corrêa (2006) supports this conclusion by showing 
that the main financial movements occur in cities 
with an intense demographic concentration and strong 
economic growth.
In terms of the number of bank parent companies 
(hereinafter referred to as head offi ces), the concentration 
that exists in São Paulo is clearly visible: at least 50% 
of bank have their head offi ces in that city in every year 
analysed. The State of Rio de Janeiro also is home to a 
large number of bank head offi ces, which contributes 
to their high degree of concentration in the southeast, a 
region that had 77% of head offi ces in 1995, but nearly 
78.7% of them in 2004. Nonetheless, the percentage in 
the State of Rio de Janeiro itself dropped sharply from 
19% to 14%. It is notable that all bank head offi ces in 
the northern region are in the State of Pará, all of those 
the centre-west region are in the Federal District, and 
all of them are publicly owned.7
Nationwide, the number of bank head offices 
decreased by about 25%, in the period analysed, and 
the process was more accentuated after 1998. In 1995, 
a total of 21 federal units were home to at least one 
bank head offi ce, and there were 22 in 1996. From 
1997 onwards, there was a new process of regional 
concentration among head offi ces, such that in 2004, 
only 14 federative units had one or more bank head 
offi ce (Central Bank of Brazil, 2006). 
Nonetheless, the spatial distribution of economic 
activity, at least in the case of Brazil, does not seem 
to be only factor explaining the level and trend of 
bank concentration; and the relation between GDP 
share of and the share of credit operations is not direct 
(Alexandre, Tadeo Lima and Canuto, 2005). 
Sicsú and Crocco (2003) study the reasons why 
a bank locates a branch in a given region. The factors 
that motivate location of the bank head office are 
not necessarily the same as determine the location of 
branches. Agglomeration factors, for example, would 
have more of an effect on the location of the bank 
head offi ces than on branch location. These authors 
believe that dispersion forces are not yet suffi ciently 
strong to cause activities to be relocated away from the 
large fi nancial centres; and there is even more reason 
to doubt their effect on branch location. In the case of 
head offi ces, certain labour-market characteristics are 
probably more important, such as being able to fi nd 
specialist labour. The same reasoning holds true for the 
demand for intermediate services and the dissemination 
of information technologies. In the latter case, branch 
clustering would not be necessary because head offi ces 
can transfer innovations to them.
Three related variables need to be taken into 
account to explain branch location: (i) demographic 
factors; (ii) income; and (iii) income distribution. 
These three factors are positively related to the number 
of branches existing in a given locality, such that the 
larger the population and income, and the better the 
income distribution, the greater will be the expected 
number of branches.
Nonetheless, although bank concentration exists, 
it is important to verify whether the market is 
imperfect.8 According to Belaisch (2003), Brazil has an 
oligopolistic banking structure, in which bank earnings 
benefi t from geographic diversifi cation.9 Nakane (2001) 
argues that, while the Brazilian banking sector does 
not act as a cartel, nor does it act competitively. This 
author also fi nds that Brazilian banks use their market 
power in the long-term more than in the short term. 
Accordingly, the behaviour of the Brazilian banking 
8 According to Tonooka and Koyama (2003, p.16), apart from the 
bills of exchange market, all markets display relatively low levels 
of concentration, possibly low enough not to notice the existence 
of market power among the banks. This result was obtained in a 
case-by-case analysis of the products offered by banks, but without 
considering the regional dimension, on which the authors themselves 
raise the possibility of the existence of regional market power.
9 The results do not make it possible to state that foreign banks also 
behave in an oligopolistic manner. In these cases, earnings are more 
sensitive to costs. Morever, the increased competition in the banking 
sector cannot be considered as the force lowering interest rates in 
the case of Brazil (Belaisch, 2003).
7 In 2004, the banks with head offi ces in the Federal District were 
Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco de Brasilia 
(BRB) and Bancoob. BASA and Banpará had their head offi ces in 
the State of Pará.
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sector is consistent with an intermediate model between 
perfect competition and monopoly/cartel (Nakane, 
Alencar and Kanczuk, 2006). There are signs that 
regional factors have a strong infl uence on the level of 
market competitiveness and on bank lending activity.
With regard to lending, there are two other factors 
that affect the amounts lent: (i) the concept of hub-
and-spoke regions: in the latter, which are seen as 
less stable, the banks show liquidity preference and 
credit is rationed; (ii) the concentration of bank head 
offi ces, which, in conjunction with information costs, 
accentuates the lack of knowledge in regions that are 
more distant from the bank’s decision-making centres, 
making banks more cautious when lending to these 
regions. The decision to lend will depend on the trust 
that banks place in the available information base.
The climate of greater uncertainty in peripheral 
regions, together with the concentration of bank head 
offi ces in regions considered central, where information 
on the periphery is more remote, tends to result in a 
concentration of credit, which perpetuates and even 
reinforces the inequality that exists in the economy. 
Moreover, banks with nationwide activities tended to 
lend in peripheral regions through affi liate fi rms that 
also have their headquarters in the central region, and 
with which the bank has had previous dealings. Amado 
(2006) argues that the bank concentration process was 
fuelled particularly by the fact of not having given any 
importance to the existence of regional banks.
In addition, if credit already tends to be restricted 
in peripheral regions, the constraint may be even 
tighter for smaller firms, since it is hard to obtain 
information on them. Consequently, if such fi rms seek 
bank fi nancing, they will probably turn to local banks, 
if they exist. The latter, meanwhile, will take advantage 
of geographic proximity, knowing that the customer 
will fi nd it very hard to obtain fi nancing in any more 
distant institution.
According to data from the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE), São Paulo and the 
Federal District account for larger shares of the total 
credit stock than their GDP shares. The case of São 
Paulo refl ects the concentration of credit in the country, 
the counterpart of which is a leakage of deposits from 
states such as Acre, whose deposit share curve is above 
its credit share curve. The case of the Federal District 
seems to refl ect the fact that the large public sector 
banks have their head offi ces located there.10
The trend of the State of Minas Gerais is 
interesting, because at the start of the series under 
study it matched the characteristics of a region from 
which saving was leaking. Between 2002 and 2004, 
however, the difference between its deposit and credit 
shares narrowed, such that those leakages practically 
ceased to exist in the fi nal year of the analysis. 
It is worth reiterating that the relation between 
credit and GDP is not direct. São Paulo has seen its 
national GDP share shrink, but its share of the stock of 
credit has grown, which in this case also indicates the 
effects of the bank concentration process. Clearly, São 
Paulo benefi ts as the home to several national business 
groups; and, as noted above, the large national banks 
prefer to lend to peripheral regions through fi rms that 
have their head offi ces in the central region.
10 The operations of the two largest public banks (Banco do Brasil 
and Caixa Econômica Federal), are more heavily concentrated in 
the Federal District than in the other States (Vasconcelos, Fucidji 
and others, 2004, p.10). Accordingly, and given that public- and 
private-sector banks have different lending rationales, these authors 
decided to remove the Federal District from the analysis.
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Sicsú and Crocco (2003) try to identify the key 
variables governing the location of bank branches. The 
expectation is that where there are a larger number 
of branches more loans will be granted. To make a 
comparison between States, a ratio between State 
population and the number of bank branches (POPAG) 
need to be calculated, seeking to refl ect the scope of 
the activity of each branch.11 The larger this ratio, 
the smaller will be the presence of bank branches in 
relation to the population and, hence, the smaller the 
amount of lending in the region.
The region’s per capita income (PIBPC), together 
with the degree of income concentration (THEIL), 
complete the variables identifi ed as relevant for bank 
branch location. Although these variables have not 
been introduced with same format as in Sicsú and 
Crocco (2003), all three are present in the model: GDP 
per capita, Theil index and the population/number of 
branches ratio. GDP per capita would be expected to 
have a positive sign, i.e. the higher the average income 
of the region’s population, the larger will be the stock 
of credit per capita. In the case of the concentration 
index, the expected sign is ambiguous, since income 
concentration can both discourage –regions with 
higher concentration tend to have a smaller number of 
branches– and stimulate, depending on local or sector-
level policies that give incentives for credit as an tool 
of the regional income deconcentration process. 
It should be noted that the number of branches 
used here relates to the number of branches with 
balances recorded at the Central Bank of Brazil. This 
was done to reconcile the number of branches with data 
on the stock of credit and demand deposits that are 
withdrawn from the balances in question. Henceforth 
this distinction will not be made, and the number of 
registered branches will be referred to simply as the 
number of branches.
Both credit and deposit data refer to the stock as of 
December each year, and are the result of aggregating 
a set of variables according to the National Financial 
System Accounting Plan (COSIF).12 Lending is referred 11 Sicsú and Crocco (2003) developed two indices of the geographic 
distribution of bank branches, to make it easier to compare the results 
and gain a better understanding of the way location decisions are 
taken. One of the indices is the ratio between the State’s share of 
the national population, and the State’s share in the number of bank 
branches in the country as a whole. The second index has the same 
rationale but uses the GDP share instead of the population share. This 
article uses a simpler ratio, between the population of the federative 
unit and the number of branches located in it.
IV 
Bank concentration and lending:
empirical results in the case of Brazil
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above, the estimated model has the stock of credit as dependent 
variable and can be described as follows:
iITITTITITITITIT UDUMMYANONUMSEDESELICTHEILPOPAGPIBPCDVPCCREDPC ++++++++= 16543210 δβββββββ  
CREDPCit: logarithm of the stock of credit per capita in the federative unit (UFi);
DVPCti: logarithm of the stock of deposits in the UFi; 
PIBPCti: logarithm of per capita GDP of the UFi;
POPAGti: logarithm of the ratio population/number of branches in the UFi;
THEILti: Theil index in the UFi;
SELICIt-1: logarithm of the interest rate lagged by one period;
NUMSEDEIt: number of bank branches existing in the UFi;
DUMMYANO1: Simulation for the period 1995-1999.
Ui: Error component (idiosyncratic and specifi c errors)
12 COSIF was created by Circular 1.273 of 29 December 1987, 
with the aim of unifying the various accounting plans in existence 
at the time, and to standardize record keeping procedures and the 
preparation of fi nancial statements (Central Bank of Brazil, 2006).
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to as credit transactions and encompasses loans and 
discounted bills, fi nancing, rural fi nancing for crop 
farming and livestock activity,13 agribusiness fi nancing, 
appropriation of rents from rural and agribusiness 
financing operations, real estate financing, special 
transactions, credits in liquidation and other credit 
transactions. Deposits include those of the Government 
and the private sector. 
Use of the deposit variable in the same period, 
unlagged, refl ects the fact that banks manage their 
liabilities actively, which is characteristic of the 
evolution of the banking system (De Paula and Alves 
Jr., 2003).14 A positive relation between deposits 
and lending is expected, as widely recognized in the 
relevant theory. 
Inclusion in the model of the population/
number of branches ratio takes account of the 
regional concentration of branches. Nonetheless, the 
concentration of bank head offi ces also needs to be 
considered. To do this, the variable NUMSEDE measures 
the number of head offi ces existing in a given federative 
unit each year. The data were obtained from cadastral 
and accounting data published by the Central Bank 
of Brazil. The larger the number of bank head offi ces 
in a given region, the easier it would be to obtain 
information on customers and projects, and more likely 
that the regional market is competitive, which facilitates 
access to credit.
The variable NUMSEDE represents the number 
of head offices in the data we have analysed. The 
information obtained on credit, deposits and a number 
of branches refers to commercial banks, full-service 
banks with a commercial portfolio, and savings banks 
(caixas econômicas). The NUMSEDE variable also 
includes the entire list of banks considered by De Paula 
and Alves Jr. (2003), which could contain one or two 
that do not match the description of banks whose data 
we have analysed. We have not attempted to adjust 
the list, for fear of making an error in the decision to 
exclude (or maintain) the banks included on the list. 
Lastly, a dummy variable (DUMMYANO) was 
included for the 1995-1999 stage, along with the 
interest rate variable (SELIC).15 The dummy variable 
seeks to capture the difference that exists in the 
sector consolidation process between that stage and 
2000-2004, as analysed in Vasconcelos, Fucidji and 
others (2004). For the years 1995-1999, the value of 
the dummy variable is set at one, while for the years 
2000-2004 it is zero. As noted above, the consolidation 
process in this fi rst stage, in which a larger number 
of banks disappeared, had a smaller impact on the 
concentration of total banking sector assets than the 
subsequent stage. Following the concentration that 
occurred in 1995-1999, presumably the banks made 
more effective use of the market power gained in 
the process. Accordingly, the average credit stock in 
the initial stage should be greater than in 2000-2004, 
ending with a positive sign for DUMMYANO.
The real interest rate variable (SELIC) is calculated 
on the basis of the over-SELIC rate, minus the broad-
based consumer price index (IPCA),16 since this is an 
index that is less affected by exchange-rate variations, 
and it is the offi cial infl ation index. An annual interest-
rate series was used, with data obtained on a daily basis 
using the value prevailing on the last day of the year. 
In addition, as widely recognized in economic theory, 
the effect of the interest rate on the economy has a time 
lag. Nonetheless, as the series analysed here consists of 
10 observations, the time series is too small to apply 
time-series tests to identify the most appropriate lag. 
As it is impossible to adopt a lag shorter than one year, 
and given that a longer lag is unnecessary to capture 
the effects of the interest rate on the economy, it was 
decided to use a one-period (one year) lag. Again 
following economic theory, a negative relation is 
expected between the interest rate and lending. 
With the aim of capturing the real effects of the 
variables, data on credit (CREDPC) and deposits (DVPC) 
were adjusted to December 2004 values, using the IPCA. 
For the GDP per capita variable (PIBPC) the implicit 
defl ator was adopted, which is traditionally used to 
correct current GDP values. No infl ation correction was 
necessary for the other variables.
13 Rural fi nancing for crop farming and livestock activity includes 
cost/investment and marketing accounts.
14 The evolution of the banking system can be described as follows: 
in the fi rst phase, deposits are the systemic constraint and serve as the 
parameter for reserves and credits. In the second phase, deposits are 
treated as means of payment, and banks extend credits a multiple of 
their reserves. The third phase allows for the possibility of interbank 
loans, thus liberating lending from the reserves constraint, since 
reserves limit the system as a whole and not a specifi c bank. In the 
fourth phase, the monetary authority assumes the role of lender of 
last resort, and the entire system is freed from the reserves constraint. 
The fi fth and last phase is characterised by the management of the 
banks’ liabilities; the banks make loans and then seek new deposits 
to bring their balance sheets into line (Amado, 1998).
15 The acronym SELIC stands for Sistema Especial de Liquidação e 
Custódia (Special Settlement and Custody System).
16 As stock data are being analysed, the December-December 
broad-based consumer price index (IPCA) was used, rather than the 
average for the year.
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In the case of the Theil income concentration 
index (THEIL), the data series have a gap in 2000 (a 
census year). To estimate values for that year and ensure 
balanced panel data,17 an interpolation was made over 
the years 1997-2003, giving a greater weight to the years 
closest to 2000. Making the interpolation over several 
years and using this weighting, the aim was to smooth 
the series and identify the trend more effectively.
Lastly, to facilitate sensitivity analysis, all 
variables were converted into logarithmic form, except 
for the Theil index, the number of head offi ces and the 
dummy variable for 1995-1999. In addition, variables 
for credit per capita, deposits per capita and GDP per 
capita were used to allow a better comparison or scaling 
of the effect of bank concentration on lending.
Although the study by Vasconcelos, Fucidji and 
others (2004) excluded the Federal District, as noted 
above, to avoid a possible bias in the results owing to 
the inherent characteristics of that region, this paper 
considers all federative units, because the Federal 
District is not the only one with specifi c characteristics; 
São Paulo and other units also do. It is precisely those 
characteristics that are captured by panel-data models. 
Moreover, unlike the aforementioned study, here we 
do not attempt to analyse the differences that exist 
between loans extended by public and private banks, 
but instead focus on the effect of bank concentration 
on lending.
Although legal and regulatory issues are relevant 
to the analysis, we do not consider them in this study 
because the legal framework governing the banking 
system is the same in all Brazilian States.
Data on credit, deposits and branches are obtained 
from the Central Bank of Brazil. GDP per capita, the 
Theil concentration index series and the interest-
rate series, together with infl ation rates and data on 
population, were all obtained from the Institute of 
Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and IBGE. The 
descriptive statistical data are presented below (see 
table 3). 
Using the variables described above, and with the 
aim of showing that the process of bank concentration 
resulted in a concentration of credit, panel data were 
analysed for the 27 federative units over the period 
1995-2004.
As panel data contain periodic observations on the 
same variables, there are many opportunities to resolve 
issues that cross-section models cannot adequately deal 
with. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) argue that panel 
data modelling makes the estimation more accurate. 
Panel data modelling offers the following advantages: 
(i) it takes account of individual heterogeneity (in 
this case among the federative units); (ii) it offers 
more information, greater variability, less collinearity 
between the variables, more degrees of freedom and 
greater effi ciency; (iii) it is better for studying the 
dynamic of adjustment; (iv) it is better for identifying 
and quantifying effects that simply cannot be detected 
in a pure cross-section or pure time-series model; and 
(v) it allows for the construction and testing of more 
complex behavioural models (Baltagi, 2005). 
Various models can be estimated using panel 
data, including: (i) pooled; (ii) random-effect; and 
(iii) fi xed-effect models. There are also different ways 
to estimate the coeffi cients, the most common being: 
(i) pooled ordinary least squares (ii) between effect; 
17 Methods exist for estimating unbalanced panel data; for further 
details see Wooldridge (2002). Nonetheless, as the series analysed 
here does not span many years, it was decided to balance the panel 
data rather than exclude data from the series.
TABLE 3
Brazil: descriptive statistical data, 1995-2004
 Variable Observations  Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
 CREDPC 270 74.163 0.9643 58.830 104.674
 DVPC 270 58.667 0.5971 48.132 80.727
 PIBPC 270 87.607 0.5321 76.695 99.756
 POPAG 270 95.831 0.4840 87.115 105.355
 THEIL 270 0.6850 0.1116 0.3388 0.9608
 SELIC 270 25.784 0.5012 18.617 35.218
 NUMSEDE 270 46.407 130.902 0 76
 DUMMYANO 270 0.5 0.5009 0 1
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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(iii) considering the fi xed effect; (iv) taking the fi rst 
difference; and (v) considering the random effect. Table 
4 shows the consistency of the estimators, in linear 
models, for different ways of obtaining the coeffi cients 
and the estimated panel model. 
The model proposed may contain endogenous 
variables, specifi cally deposits (DVPC) and GDP (PIBPC). 
Nonetheless, the variables are highly correlated with 
their own lag, which affects their use as instruments. 
For that reason, and given the diffi culty of obtaining 
other effective instruments, the model is estimated 
assuming exogeneity. Although it would be better if 
the variables GDP (PIBPC) and interest rate (SELIC) 
use the respective expectations, there is no data series 
covering the entire period studied.
The correlation matrix (see table 5) shows that 
the positive relation between the income concentration 
index (THEIL) and the population/number of branches 
ratio (POPAG) corroborates the arguments put forward 
by Sicsú and Crocco (2003): the more concentrated 
income is in a given region, the smaller is the number of 
branches needed to capture disposable income, and the 
greater will be the population/branches ratio. Similarly, 
the larger the population/branches ratio, the smaller will 
be credit per capita, which shows that the presence of 
bank branches is essential for lending.
The variable PIBPC displays a positive and 
signif icant relation both with the stock of credit 
(OCREDPC), and with the stock of deposits (DVPC), 
as predicted by theory. The interest rate (SELIC) is 
negatively related to per capita GDP, as also predicted 
by theory, possibly arising from negative effects of 
interest rate increases on lending; in contrast, it is 
positively related to the stock of credit and deposits. 
This relation may also refl ect the fact that deposits 
as analysed here correspond to the stock of deposits, 
which may be subject some type of correction.
The number of head off ices (NUMSEDE) is 
positively related to the stock of credit, which reinforces 
the notion that a regional presence not only of branches 
but also of head offi ces affects lending. There is also a 
negative relation between the number of head offi ces 
(NUMSEDE) and the population/number of branches 
ratio (POPAG). This means that the larger the number of 
TABLE 4
Brazil: linear panel data models
 Estimation method Assumed model
 Pooled data  Random effects  Fixed effects
Pooled ordinary least squares Consistent Consistent Inconsistent
Between effect Consistent Consistent Inconsistent
Fixed effects Consistent Consistent Consistent
First difference Consistent Consistent Consistent
Random effect Consistent Consistent Inconsistent
Source: Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 699).
TABLE 5
Brazil: correlation matrix, 1995-2004
 CREDPC DVPC PIBPC POPAG THEIL SELIC NUMSEDE DUMMYANO
CREDPC 1.0000
DVPC 0.7361 1.0000
PIBPC 0.6895 0.8087 1.0000
POPAG -0.7859 -0.6579 -0.7581 1.0000
THEIL -0.0715 -0.3186 -0.4666 0.2952 1.0000
SELIC 0.2371 0.0232 -0.0667 -0.0252 0.1091 1.0000
NUMSEDE 0.4657 0.4137 0.4239 -0.3888 -0.1941 0.0163 1.0000
DUMMYANO 0.3217 -0.0576 -0.0729 -0.0904 0.1544 0.8127 0.0284 1.0000
Source: prepared by the authors.
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bank head offi ces in a given region, the greater will be 
the presence of branches located there, thereby reducing 
the population/number of branches ratio.
Another correlation that corroborates the hypothesis 
tested in this study is that obtained by the dummy 
variable for 1995-1999 (DUMMYANO). This is positively 
related to the stock of credit per capita, indicating that 
the stock of credit in that stage was on average greater 
than that obtained in the following phase.
Lastly, in the case of the ratios considered in 
the correlation matrix, and assuming there is a strong 
correlation between variables for absolute values above 
0.8, the stock of deposits is strongly correlated with per 
capita GDP; and the interest rate is strongly correlated 
with the dummy variable in 1995-1999.
The variance infl ation factor (VIF) was calculated 
to test for multicollinearity in the model. Specialist 
publications usually consider that severe multi-
collinearity exists when the VIF has a value greater than 
5. In this case, it is below 5 for all of the variables in the 
model. Accordingly, the model was estimated without 
excluding any of the variables analysed here.
All other models were estimated by adjusting the 
variance matrix to the robust form. As shown in table 
6, the results obtained with pooled data were closest to 
expectations. In the pooled data model the coeffi cients 
obtained for all variables are statistically signifi cant at 
the 1% level, apart from GDP per capita and interest 
rate, which are signifi cant at 10%. 
Analysing the pooled-data model shows that, as 
expected, the larger of the stock of deposits per capita 
and the higher is GDP per capita, the larger will be 
the stock of credit per capita. The signs obtained for 
the population/number of branches ratio, and also for 
the number of head offi ces, corroborate the hypothesis 
postulated here. Thus, the larger the populations/
branches ratio, the smaller the per capita credit stock, 
thus highlighting one of the negative consequences of 
the bank concentration process, namely the regional 
concentration of bank branches.
In addition, the larger the number of bank head 
offi ces in a given region, the larger the per capita credit 
stock. Nonetheless, the coefficient of NUMSEDE is 
small, which suggests it has a small impact on the credit 
stock. These results strengthen the foregoing analysis of 
the negative effects of the process of bank consultation 
on lending in the regional domain. Nonetheless, the 
bank branch relocation process had a greater effect on 
lending than the concentration of head offi ces.
These results suggest that branches have some 
degree of autonomy in making lending decisions; or 
TABLE 6
Brazil: estimation resultsa
Independent variables Pooled   Random Fixed
 ordinary  effects effects
 least
 squares
DVPC 0.666b 0.497b 0.319c
  (0.093) (0.121) (0.144)
PIBPC 0.177d 0.159 -0.403
  (0.107) (0.178) (0.396)
POPAG -0.834b -0.959b -1.014b
  (0.084) (0.144) (0.349)
THEIL 1.831b 1.366b 1.006b
  (0.309) (0.364) (0.375)
SELIC - 0.158d -0.104 -0.065
  (0.092) (0.079) (0.101)
NUMSEDE 0.009b 0.010b 0.019
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.016)
DUMMYANO 0.664b 0.610b 0.523b
  (0.101) (0.086) (0.114)
Constant 8.746b 11.300b 17.944b
  -1.605 -2.755 -4.144
Comments 243 243 243
R2 0.84 0.54 0.56
F- value     44.39
      0.0000
Variance infl ation factor 2.79    
Rho statistic   0.3361 0.6602
HAUSMAN test   12.52  
    0.0848  
BREUSCH-PAGAN test   70.66  
    0.0000
Source: Prepared by the authors, using data from the study.
a Robust standard deviations shown in parentheses.
b Statistically signifi cant at 1%. 
c Statistically signifi cant at 5%. 
d Statistically signifi cant at 10%.
otherwise the type of loans granted –small and mostly 
to private individuals– means that the decision can be 
taken at the branch level. 
As shown in the correlation matrix, the reduction 
in the number of head offi ces is negatively related to 
the POPAG variable. Moreover, taking account of the 
motivations driving the consolidation process, is not 
unreasonable to assume a causality relation between 
these variables, with the reduction in the number of 
head offi ces acting as one of the reasons for an increase 
in the population/branches ratio.
One way to reduce the negative impact of the drop 
in the number of branches is by using correspondent 
banks, which, as seen above, can also process loan 
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and fi nancing proposals. Assuming the application is 
sent to the nearest branch, for logistical reasons, this 
effect would be captured in our analysis because its 
focus is regional and not municipal. Moreover, if the 
performance of the correspondent bank is above the 
regional average, the sign of the POPAG variable could 
be reversed, and it could even become non-signifi cant. 
The fact that the result was as expected suggests that 
the correspondent bank modality does not change the 
negative impact on lending caused by a reduction in the 
number of branches in relation to the population.
Another aspect worth noting is the empirical 
confi rmation of the need to divide the analysis period in 
two. In the fi rst stage, 1995-1999, the per capita capital 
stock is greater than in 2000-2004. It can therefore be 
inferred that following an initial stage of far-reaching 
adjustments and vigorous concentration of the banking 
system, the banks that emerged from the process then 
made loans on a more rationed basis. 
Clearly, the economic climate changed. But, this 
does not seem to be the origin of the reduction in the 
per capita credit stock in 1999-2004, since the period 
1995-1999 included crises in Mexico, Asia and Russia, 
and also in Brazil, which put an end to exchange-rate 
fl otation in 1999 and resulted in the adoption of an 
infl ation targeting policy. In 1999-2004, there was only 
one crisis, the energy crisis, so the decline in the per 
capita credit stock in those years cannot be blamed on 
the external environment and crisis episodes. 
It would therefore be no exaggeration to claim 
that banks intensifi ed credit rationing in the second 
stage, when they enjoyed greater market power than 
previously. 
Contrary to the results obtained in the correlation 
matrix, the interest-rate variable with a one-year lag 
shows a negative effect on credit, thus corroborating 
the fi ndings reported by Araújo and Dias (2006). Given 
the economic situation in Brazil during that period, one 
can gauge the magnitude of the effects of the interest 
rate on lending, and hence on regional development. 
While the consolidation of the banking sector was 
taking place, real interest rates in Brazil were high, 
which magnifi ed the impact on lending.
The deposit-stock, GDP-per-capita and interest-
rate variables are all expressed in logarithmic form, 
to facilitate sensitivity analysis on the credit stock 
with respect to fl uctuations in these variables. One 
can therefore infer that a variation of 1% in the stock 
of deposits per capita raises the per capita credit 
stock by roughly 0.7%. A GDP per capita variation on 
this order, means an increase of 0.18% of the credit 
stock. Each percentage point rise in the interest rate 
causes a reduction of around 0.16% in the per capita 
credit stock.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the model used here 
reports an R2 of 84%, thereby demonstrating its high 
explanatory capacity.
Analysing results for the random- and fi xed-effects 
models, the fi ndings, despite losing signifi cance, are 
in the same direction as the expected results and 
those obtained for the pooled data model. Loss of 
signifi cance for some variables may refl ect the fact 
that the fi xed-effects model considers specifi c effects 
of each federative unit, and there may be special 
characteristics for each region that affect the stock of 
credit, i.e. differentiated regional dynamics.
In any event, the random-effects model provides 
results that are closer to those obtained with pooled 
data than those using a fi xed effects model; and this is 
precisely the most appropriate model according to the 
result obtained using the Hausman test. With regard to 
the serial autocorrelation of the residuals, the random 
effects model does not display autocorrelation at the 
5% level.
The Breusch-Pagan test also rejects the hypothesis 
that the variance of the specifi c component is zero, 
which suggests it would be better to use a random-
effects model in relation to the pooled data model. 
Similarly, the Rho statistic shows that the variance 
of the specifi c component is high in relation to the 
total variance of the residual, particularly in the fi xed-
effects model, thus demonstrating importance of that 
component.
Estimation of the random-effects model shows that 
the GDP per capita variable (PIBPC) loses signifi cance, 
as does the interest-rate variable (SELIC). As explained 
in the previous section, the over-SELIC interest-rate was 
used, but this is only the base rate for the economy 
and not the rate obtained on a loan. As is well known, 
bank spreads were high in the Brazilian economy in 
1995-2004, which meant high interest rates for the 
fi nal borrower. Accordingly, the loss of signifi cance of 
the interest rate, both with the random-effect and with 
the fi xed-effects model, may be the result of using the 
economy’s base interest rate. 
The other results for the random-effects model are 
similar to those obtained with the pooled data model, 
but differ in terms of the magnitude of the coeffi cients. 
Here, it is worth highlighting the variation obtained for 
the coeffi cient on the population/number of branches 
ratio (POPAG), which makes the credit effects of this 
variable even more important. 
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Lastly –but no less important– the privatization 
process can explain much but not all of the sharp 
reduction in the number of bank head offices. In 
addition to privatizations, several State-owned banks 
were liquidated, and there were also bank mergers 
and acquisitions. The results show that the branch 
relocation was more significant than the reduction 
in the number of head offi ces (the coeffi cient on the 
bank head offi ce variable is statistically signifi cant but 
small). Nonetheless, the variable POPAG is negatively 
correlated with the SEDE variable, suggesting that a 
reduction in the number of head offi ces could cause 
an increase in the population/ branches ratio. This 
seems to be corroborated by the frequent practice of 
trying to obtain synergy and scale benefi ts following 
a merger or acquisition. In particular, following bank 
privatizations, it was common for branches to close, 
particularly in the less dynamic markets.
Studies that analyse panel data normally present 
the same model in cross sections for all the years 
studied, so as to gain a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the process and to corroborate the results 
obtained, thereby making the model more robust. As 
our model includes a time-lagged variable, however, it 
is impossible to perform this robustness test.
Moreover, if the Theil index is replaced by the 
Gini coefficient to verify the model’s robustness, 
the results are practically unchanged, except for the 
coeffi cient of the concentration variable itself, which 
is clearly higher, and the GDP per capita variable which 
ceases to be statistically signifi cant. 
In any event, taking account of the correlation 
matrix and the results obtained with the pooled data 
model and random-effects model using panel data, 
which was the method indicated by the Hausman test, 
the results corroborate the hypothesis as formulated and 
the analysis made in the previous sections.
In other words, if one analyses the process of 
banking sector consolidation in Brazil from the regional 
standpoint, its effect on lending is adverse. The number 
of bank branches serving the peripheral region falls, 
the presence of bank head offi ces virtually disappears, 
and credit is even more rationed.
V
Conclusions
This article has sought to identify the effects of bank 
concentration on lending, based on the hypothesis that 
consolidation of the banking sector reduces the number 
of loans granted. This hypothesis is corroborated by 
the results obtained. It was clear that the presence 
of bank branches and head offi ces in the regions is 
positively related to lending. Accordingly, the relocation 
of branches in the country’s most developed regions, 
together with the regional concentration of bank head 
offices, reduces the per capita credit stock in the 
other regions. The results also show that the branch 
relocation process has a greater affect on lending than 
the concentration of head offi ces.
The fact that the regions which lost bank head 
offi ces and displayed a higher population/number of 
branches ratio are also the less developed regions, 
suggests the presence of a mechanism that obstructs 
their development. With regard to the effects of bank 
concentration, empirical observation shows that 
following a period of sharp adjustment, the banks 
started to ration credit much more, possibly as a result 
of the greater market power they had gained.
The other results obtained show that the model is 
consistent with current theory, whereby both GDP per 
capita and the stock deposits have favourable effects 
on lending, whereas interest-rate variations have the 
opposite effect on the credit stock.
One way of obtaining more robust results, 
which could be a topic for future research, is to use 
expectations for economic growth, interest rates and 
infl ation as explanatory variables. Another possibility 
is to use detailed data for each municipality and 
disaggregate credit by transaction type (i.e. for each 
product offered by the bank). According to Corvosier 
and Gropp (2001), the nature of the product is an 
important element in analysing bank concentration 
and its effects on the interest rates charged. Moreover, 
banks in Brazil hold public-sector bonds in their 
portfolio that ensure them quite substantial liquidity 
and profi tability. With a net public-sector debt of 47% 
of GDP in 2006, the banks, both private and public, 
definitely underwrote their profitability with those 
bonds. The impact of that strategy on the supply of 
credit should not be ignored, and probably explains part 
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of the concentration of credit in Brazil. In practice, the 
banks extend credit to the National Treasury through 
their demand for government bonds.
As pointed out by Cavalcante, Crocco and Jayme 
Jr. (2004), the supply of credit is affected not only 
by liquidity preference, but also by the degree of 
development of the banking system. It would therefore 
be worth making a more in-depth study of the level 
of development of the banking and fi nancial system 
in Brazil. In view of the results obtained in this study, 
it would be interesting to create a mechanism to 
stimulate the deconcentration of bank head offi ces, 
which could take the form of a cut in bank reserve 
ratios or a reduction in taxes. Regional development 
funds are also very important, as noted by Jayme Jr. and 
Crocco (2007), and they can channel credit under more 
favourable conditions towards the less dynamic regions. 
These funds can be used under the same principle as 
applied by the Brazilian National Development Bank 
(BNDES) with its fi nancial agents; i.e. the Government 
could make these funds available for use by all fi nancial 
institutions, which would increase competition and also 
the transparency of this fi nancing.
Lastly, by adjusting the legal and regulatory 
framework governing the fi nancial and legal system in 
Brazil –a topic that is beyond the scope of this article– a 
more favourable climate could be created for lending. 
Similarly, capital-market strengthening as an alternative 
to capture resources could open up a new possibilities 
for the larger fi rms. 
(Original: Portuguese)
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